Chiudi

Aggiungi l'articolo in

Chiudi
Aggiunto

L’articolo è stato aggiunto alla lista dei desideri

Chiudi

Crea nuova lista

Condemned to Repetition?: The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996 - Andrew Bennett - cover
Condemned to Repetition?: The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996 - Andrew Bennett - cover
Dati e Statistiche
Wishlist Salvato in 0 liste dei desideri
Condemned to Repetition?: The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996
Disponibile in 2 settimane
43,00 €
43,00 €
Disp. in 2 settimane
Chiudi
Altri venditori
Prezzo e spese di spedizione
ibs
43,00 € Spedizione gratuita
disponibile in 2 settimane disponibile in 2 settimane
Info
Nuovo
Altri venditori
Prezzo e spese di spedizione
ibs
43,00 € Spedizione gratuita
disponibile in 2 settimane disponibile in 2 settimane
Info
Nuovo
Altri venditori
Prezzo e spese di spedizione
Chiudi

Tutti i formati ed edizioni

Chiudi
Condemned to Repetition?: The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996 - Andrew Bennett - cover
Chiudi

Promo attive (0)

Descrizione


Why did the Soviet Union use less force to preserve the Soviet empire from 1989 to 1991 than it had used in distant and impoverished Angola in 1975? This book fills a key gap in international relations theories by examining how actors' preferences and causal conceptions change as they learn from their experiences. Andrew Bennett draws on interviews and declassified Politburo documents as well as numerous public statements to establish the views of Soviet and Russian officials. He argues that Soviet leaders drew lessons from their apparent successes in Vietnam and elsewhere in the 1970s that made them more interventionist. Then, as casualties in Afghanistan mounted in the 1980s, Soviet leaders learned different lessons that led them to withdraw from regional conflicts and even to abstain from the use of force as the Soviet empire dissolved. The loss of this empire led to exaggerated fears of "domino effects" within Russia and a resurgence of interventionist views, culminating in the Russian invasion of Chechnya in 1994. Throughout this process, Soviet and Russian leaders and policy experts were divided into competing schools of thought as much by the information to which they were exposed as by their apparent material interests. This helps explain how Gorbachev and other new thinkers were able to prevail over the powerful military-party-industrial complex that had dominated Soviet politics since Stalin's time.
Leggi di più Leggi di meno

Dettagli

Belfer Center Studies in International Security
1999
Paperback / softback
400 p.
Testo in English
231 x 155 mm
658 gr.
9780262522571
Chiudi
Aggiunto

L'articolo è stato aggiunto al carrello

Chiudi

Aggiungi l'articolo in

Chiudi
Aggiunto

L’articolo è stato aggiunto alla lista dei desideri

Chiudi

Crea nuova lista

Chiudi

Chiudi

Siamo spiacenti si è verificato un errore imprevisto, la preghiamo di riprovare.

Chiudi

Verrai avvisato via email sulle novità di Nome Autore